Various sanskrit documents. for research students.
The Viikyapadiya of Bhartrhari and the Pramii1Jasamuccaya of Dignaga • are seminal texts in the history of ancient Indian philosophy. One text deals with grammar, the other with logic, both are the work of committed metaphysicians. Written within a span of less than a hundred years, between the fifth and the sixth centuries A.D.,Law of double negation.
Professor Daniel Ingalls published his Materials for the Study of NavyaNydya Logic in 1951. The publication of this pioneering work has been,
directly or indirectly, responsible for a number of interesting developments
in the study of Indian philosophy. Let me mention only two of them here.
First, a wide and active interest in the study and evaluation of Indian logic
has been visible, since this publication, among the scholarly circles of
Europe and America. Second, and this is more significant, modern students
of philosophy in India to whom Navya-nyaya was practically a sealed text-book
before, have begun to realize consciously the need to study and analyze
Navya-nyaya adequately. All these are matters of common knowledge.Prof. Ingalls himself discussed at some length in his book.
The phrase 'double negation' immediately calls to our mind what is now
known in the Western logical tradition as the classical law of double
negation. This law is actually derivable from the law of excluded middle and
the law of non-contradiction, and it is maintained as a law under t'classical' or standard account of negation in logic.! The logical law of
double negation, however, attracts more attention than usual when a
proposal is made to suspend or restrict it. Thus, it is well-known in Western
logic that a nonclassical or nonstandard account of negation should be
proposed for constructing nonstandard, multiple-valued logical systems.
W.V. Quine has called them 'deviant logics' and described the nonclassical
negation as a proposal for the 'mutilation' of our standard sense of
negation.2
In the context of Indian logic, the phrase 'double negation' is, however,
reminiscent of an important and very controversial doctrine of Dinnaga - the anydpoha 'the exclusion of the contrary', as a possible
nominalistic substitute for universals that are reified as meanings of general
terms. Diimaga's proposal was met with scepticism in opposite camps, and
the followers of Dinnaga apparently complicated the issue by proposing
various tentative solutions to the problem. Perhaps, the relevant problem
cannot be solved adequately unless one proposes (as Prof. H. Herzberger
has done)3 another nonstandard account of negation. My own feeling is that
to make sense of the use of negation in Buddhist philosophy in general, one
needs to venture outside the perspective of the standard notion of negation.
This is another way by which, I believe, one can provide an alternative interpretation of the so-called Madhyamika tetralemma (catu~koti).4
In Navya-nyaya the problem of 'double negation' arises in an entirely different context. And the treatment of the problem is, as may be easily understood, essentially conditioned by the peculiar Nyaya doctrine of negation. It
is obvious that the Navya-nyaya writers were not at all perturbed by the
limitations of the two-valued logic, nor did they worry much about the socalled Vedantic 'challenge' to the law of excluded middle. Moreover, the
Buddhist apoha theory was not at all directly relevant to the problem of
'double negation' in Navya-nyaya. There is, however, a minor detail in the
Navya-nyaya theory of double negation, where one might detect a reaction
to the apoha doctrine of the Buddhist.
S.D. JOSHI
THE CONTRIBUTION OF R.G. BHANDARKAR TO THE STUDY
OF SANSKRIT GRAMMAR
I wish to discuss in this paper, in honour of my guru, Professor Daniel H.H.
Ingalls, the contribution of R.G. Bhandarkar to the study of Sanskrit
Grammar, whose 50th death-anniversary occurred in 1975. For among thc
varied topics of research undertaken by Professor Ingalls, Sanskrit
Grammar has an important place.
Dr. Bhandarkar combined traditional, shastric learning with Western
scholarship. Through him, Indian students in the field of Sanskrit became
acquainted with the critical, comparative and historical method of scientific
investigation, which he applied in his own work and to which he devoted a
separate lccture in 1888.1
Ramkrishna Gopal Bhandarkar (1837-1925) was a school-master and
educationist by temperament2, a grammarian by training3, and a scholar of
the new stamp by general designation4 • He acted as a Professor of Oriental
Languages in the Elphinstone College, Bombay, from 1867, where he was
superseded by P. Peterson in 1873. In 1881, after the retirement of F.
Kielhorn, he was appointed Professor of Sanskrit at the Deccan College,
Poona5• Later he became Vice-Chancellor of the Bombay University6. He
received an honorary doctorate from the University of Gottingen7 and was a
great admirer of German scholarship all his !ifes.
The present article intends to summarize and to discuss a few topics of
grammatical and chronological interest to Bhandarkar as a grammanan.
The points dealt with come under the following heads:
(1) Pal)ini
(2) The relations among the three munis of grammar
(3) Aciirya and iicaryadeSi"ya
(4) Patanjali's date
(5) The composition of the Mahiibhii$ya
1.0
A striking characteristic of Pal)inian grammar is that it does not teach
ready-made forms and paradigms, but rules of a particular kind. The an33
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Sanskrit and Indian Studies. 33-60.
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34 S.D. JOSHI
cient Sanskrit grammarians observed and analysed usage carefully. Then,
reversing the analytic process, they phrased rules for the combination and
integration of the analytically established elements of language. A correct
application of these rules results in pure Sanskrit words ready for use in a
sentence9. A general pattern of rule ordering foIl owed by Pal)ini is that of
special rules coming under general rules. Thus, as noted by Bhandarkar, the
study of Sanskrit grammar came to possess an educational value similar to
that of Euclid. The student has to pay attention to the conditions stated in
the rules, to the relations between the rules, and he has to apply them in a
succession. It was Bhandarkar's conviction that this method of studying
grammar was superior to the one followed in Europe which was mainly
based on the study of Latin grammar. Accordingly, when G. Biihler and M.
Haug insisted on a practical method for learning Sanskrit in the Indian
secondary schoollO, Bhandarkar, in his Second Book of Sanskrit, adopted
and adapted the Pal)inian methodll.
1.1
The occasion for a discussion on a particular aspect of PaI)ini's grammar
arose when Th. Goldstiicker published his work on pal)ini. 12 His idea was
that Pal)ini was not the inventor of the grammatical system preserved in his
work, though he improved upon the system of his predecessors, and made
his own additions to itY Moreover, he availed himself of the technical
means of the older grammarians, and, in such a case, never gave any
explanation of those technicalities which must have been known to his
contemporaries, and, therefore, required no remark. 14 Here the question
arises whether or not Pal)ini was the originator of all the technical terms he
employed in his grammar.15 To answer this question, Goldstiicker refers to
P .1.2.53, the B hd$ya and Kaiyata on that. 16 The sutra is interpreted to mean
that Pal)ini does not treat samjfids, i.e. conventional names, which
admit of an etymology. According to Goldstiicker, this applies also to
grammatical terms which are etymologically significant, but not to artificial
terms like {i, ghu and bha.17 It follows that, if we find etymologically
significant technical terms pefined by Pal)ini, this should be taken to mean
that Pal)ini has coined them, at least in the sense in which he uses them.
Reversely, non-artificial technical terms not defined by PaI)ini have been
borrowed from his predecessors. IS Goldstiicker then applies his theory to
prove that Pal)ini was later than Yaska,19 and that the U~1ddisiitras were
later than P al)ini. 20
Bhandarkar criticizes Goldstiicker on four points, namely, Pal)ini's al
APOHA AND PRATIBHA
The apoha-theory which aroused much controversy concerning the meaning of the word among the Indian philosophers in the classical period was
first expounded by Dignaga in his PramtilJasamuccaya. The fifth chapter of
this comprehensive work, which is'devoted to the elucidation of the apohatheory, begins with the following verse:
na pramti(ltintaram stibdam anumtintit tathti hi tat
krtakatvtidivat svtirtham anytipohena bhti$ate1
That [means of cognition] which is based on word is not an
[independent] means of cognition other than inference. Because [the
word as the basis of] it expresses its own object through the exclusion
of the other [things], just as [the inferential markJ 'krtakatva' or the like
I establishes the object to be proved through the exclusion of what is not
a possessor of that inferential mark I.
As is clear in this verse, the function of a word is recognized by Dignaga
as identical with the function of a linga (inferential mark) in the process
of inference. That a linga functions to prove the stidhya (that which is to
be proved) through the 'exclusion of others' (anya-vyavaccheda, o-apoha)
is discussed by Dignaga in the second chapter of the same work, where
he deals with the inference for one's own sake (svtirthtinumtina).2 Take
for instance the case in which one infers fire on the mountain from smoke,
its lifiga. What is cognized by means of inference in this case is not an
individual fire that possesses various attributes peculiar to it, such as flame,
heat, and so on, but it is 'fire in general' common to all individual fires.
However, there is no 'fire in general' as a real entity. What really exists is
each individual fire possessing particular attributes. The 'fire in general' is
nothing other than a concept which is produced in the mind through the
process of thought-construction. One knows from experience that what is
not fire, e.g., earth, water, or the like, does not possess smoke. Therefore, on
seeing smoke, he understands that the object to be inferred is not a non-fire.
By excluding the non-fire, he forms the notion of 'fire'. The fire thus
conceived is shorn of particular color, flame, heat, etc. that constitute the
characteristic features of each individual fire existing in the external world. It
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62 MASAAKI HATTORI
is 'fire in general' which is a mere concept having no objective counterpart.
With this clear view of the process of inference, Dignaga asserted that a
liriga established the sddhya by means of the 'exclusion of others'.
The word functions exactly in the same way to denote the object. The
thing which is to be denoted by the word has various aspects, and no single
word is concomitant with al1 of them. A word stands for only one aspect of
the thing. 3 Accordingly, one applies various words to express one and the
same object: vrk$a (tree), pdrthiva (the earthy), dravya (substance), sat
(existent), and so on. If a word had direct reference to the real entity, all
these words would be regarded as synonymous with each other, since they
al1 refer to one and the same thing. Or, there would be the absurdity that one
thing has as many distinct realities as there are the words expressing it. It is,
therefore, hardly maintained that the word denotes a real object. The thing
in itself, which exists as the indivisible unity of various aspects, is grasped in
its totality only by means of perception free of conceptual construction. The
function of the word consists solely in differentiating the directly perceived
object from the other things. The word 'vrk$a' differentiates the object from
those which are not tree. The same object may be referred to by the word
'dravya' when it is to be differentiated from non-substances. Accordingly, as
the object is distinguished from different things, the different words are
applied to the same object. Thus it is to be concluded that the word refers
only to that portion (al]'lsa) of the object which is differentiated from the
other things. Since the object itself is an indivisible entity, the portion for
which the word stands is nothing other than the product of mental
construction. It is a concept formed through the mental act of
'differentiation from others' (anydpoha).
On the basis of this keen observation, Dignaga made elaborate arguments
against the opponents who held that the word had direct reference to the
individual (vyakti), the universal (jdti), the relation between the two
(sambandha), or the possessor of the universal (jdtimat), and' firmly
established the theory that a word expresses the object qualified by the
exclusion of the other things (arthdntaranivrtti, anydpoha).4
Individual trees are total1y different from each other, but the
'differentiation from non-trees' is common to them all. Dignaga admits that
the 'differentiation from others' is of the nature similar to the universal
(sdmdnya) which is assumed to be real by the Naiyayikas and other realists.
Like the universal, the 'differentiation from non-trees' is single (eka) in many
trees, eternal (nitya) as it resides even in a newly grown tree, and completely
subsistent in each individual tree (pratyekaparisamdpti).5 However, it is not
a positive entity like the universal. It is simply attributed to the object
through mental construction, and as such it has no objective reality.
THE SAT ARUDRIY A
The Satarudriya, constituting the sixty-six subdivisions of chapter 16 of the
Vajasaneyi-Samhita, is a litany accompanying no less than 425 oblations
and addressed to the hundred forms and powers of the god Rudra. This
solemn and awful ceremony belongs closely to the preceding chapters which
contain the formulas of the most important agnicayana, the piling of the
great fireplace; because Agni, that is the fireplace, has on completion
become Rudra, the representative of the unconquered, dangerous,
unreliable, and hence much to be feared nature.! Compare SB. 9, 1, 1, 1 "He
then performs the Satarudriya sacrifice. This whole Agni has here been
completed; he now is the deity Rudra". The sacrifice is to avcrt the god's
wrath and to secure his favour. 2 Afte~ dealing with the performance the
SalTlhita proceeds to mention the mantras relating to the propitiatory
and preparatory ceremonies in connexion with Agni. The mantras of the
Satarudriya are addressed to the various aspects and functions of Rudra
who is regarded as a metamorphosis of Wrath (Manyu); "hundred-headed,
thousand-eyed, hundred-quivered, with his bow strung and his arrow fitted
to the string, Rudra being in quest of food was inspiring fear ... " (~m. 9, 1,
1, 6). The first four mantras give a good idea of the tone and character of
the whole chapter devoted to the god with the azure neck and red hue who is
seen by herdsmen and girl-water-carriers3 (V.S. 16, 7):
Homage (be paid), 0 Rudra, to thy Wrath and to thy shaft homage,
and to thy two arms homage. With that most beneficent body (manifestation) gaze on us, 0 mountain-haunter, which, 0 Rudra, is auspicious, mild, benevolently looking. That shaft, which, 0 mountain-haunter, thou art holding in thy hand to shoot, make that, 0 mountainprotector, auspicious. Do not injure man or (other) moving beings.
With auspicious words we salute thee, 0 mountain-dweller, that all our
moving beings may be healthy and well-satisfied.
The god - who is also described as being surrounded by numerous Rudras
(VS. 16, 6; cf. 54; 65; 66), his partial manifestations, who had come into
existence at the same time as Rudra himself (SB. 9, 1, 1, 6)4 - is implored to
protect those who invoke him and to spare their lives. The sections 1,8, 14,
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76 J.GONDA
17-46, 64-66 of VS. 16 are stereotyped prose formulas beginning with
"homage (namal:z)" paid to the god, his manifestations, functions, activities,
weapons, abodes, to various beings of whom he is the lord or leader, and so
on. Thus the chapter is an early instance of the well-known Indian
enumerations of divine names and epithets the recital of which is considered
most effective as a means of compelling a god to be gracious (cf. SB. 9, 1, 1,
14; 18; 22; 24) to fulfil wishes, and meritorious as a work of devotion and a
method of entering into spiritual contact with the deity.
Although the greater part of the text is not explained or commented upon
in the Satapatha-Brahmal)a attention may be invited to a few passages in
that work. The Satarudriya offering was according to 9, 1, 1, 7 instituted by
order of Prajapati who, being afraid of Rudra, had food gathered for him
and "appeased him therewith". That food, that offering, was originally
called "that by which the deity is appeased" (idntadevatya), but "because
the gods like the cryptic" it "is here called cryptically Satarudriya", another
instance of a well-known type of etymological explanation in these texts (9,
1, 1, 2). In 9, 1, 1,43 the author informs us of how this Satarudriya sacrifice
came to attain to conformity with the year and with Agni: the 425 formulas
and oblations contained in it are the 360 days of the years, the 30 nights of
the month and the 35 days of the thirteenth month6, which is "Agni's self'.
The Satarudriya litany was not only transmitted by the followers of the
White Yajurveda. There exists also a recension in the Black Yajurveda
handed down in four versions, that is in all basic texts of that Veda that have
survived, viz. the Sarphitas of the Taittiriyas (TS. 4, 5), of the Kathas proper
(KS. 17, 11-16), of the Kapi~thala-Kathas (KapS. 27, 1-6), and of the
Maitrayal)lyas (MS. 2, 9, 2-9).7 The information given by the
corresponding brdhmm:za portions of these texts in explanation of some
particulars of the Satarudriya ritual need not detain us. Only the beginning
of TS. 5, 4, 3, 1- the brdhmar;a section belonging to TS. 4, 5 - may be
quoted:
The fire (place) is Rudra. He is born when he has been completely piled
up. Just as a calf desires the teat, so he here seeks his portion ... He
offers the SatarudrIya8 (oblation); verily he appeases him with (his own)
portion ...
Other references to the litany and the sacrifice are, in the brdhma~1as,
infrequent and almost devoid of special relevance when our object is to trace
the history of the text, the use made of it in other rituals and the religious or
philosophical significance attached to it. The author of TS. 5, 7, 3, 3,
observing that the fire is Rudra says that he has two bodies, a dread (ghora)
HINDU CONCEPTS OF TEACHER SANSKRIT GURU AND
ACARYA1
The Sanskrit words dcdrya and guru both have the meaning of'teacher'.
The etymology of dcdrya is not certain. It is generally supposed to derive
from dcdra, right conduct, or from dcarati, to approach, to go to as for
instruction, or from dcinoti, to accumulate knowledge, wealth or merit. 2
Guru derives from an Indo-european v.ord for 'heavy', its semantic
development being from heavy to important, awesome, thus, an elder, a
teacher. 3 However, it is not with etymologies that we are here concerned,
but with the finished product. In Sanskrit commentaries and versified texts
the two words are freely interchanged, as though they were exact
synonyms.4 However, the two words had separate origins, and to attribute
equal semantic value to these apparently synonymous words may efface the
subtle nuance attached to each.s In the pages which follow, we shall examine
briefly the passages where these words occur, bring to the light the aspects
in which the two words distinguish themselves from each other, and
ascertain several distinctive connotations of both words. It is with gratitude
and respect toward my guru, who is at the same time a great dcdrya in
Indological Studies, that I here take up the Hindu concepts of teacher, and
dedicate this small contribution to the guru-pujd-kaumud{ of Professor
Daniel H.H. Ingalls.
As a word used in the sense of teacher, dcdrya is older than guru. In
Atharvaveda 11.5, which praises the Brahmacarin the dcdrya is said to
seek out a vedic student (brahmacdrin),6 to take (a student) as a pupil
(upanayamdna), to bring about the rebirth of this student,7 and to fashion
both earth and sky.s In the Satapatha BrahmaJ.la, SaJ.l<;lilya and
Saptarathavahini are called dcdrya and antevdsin.9 Here the manner of the
initiation-ceremony (upanayana) is described.lO That is, upon the arrival of
Brahmacarin, the student, the dcdrya asks him his name,l1 and takes his
right hand with the words "Indra's disciple thou art; Agni is thy teacher
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94 MINORUHARA
(dcdrya). I am thy teacher (dcdrya).,,12 Taking him as a pupil the dcdrya
teaches the Savitr hymnY
The Upani~ads show this same tradition.
dCdrya-kuldd vedam adhiiya yathdvidhdnam (Chiindogya Upani~ad
8.15.1).
"Having learned the Veda from the house of a teacher according to
rule."
vedam anucydcdryo 'ntevdsinam anuidsti: satyarrz vada dharmarrz cara
(Taittiriya U pani~ad 1.11.1).
"Having taught the Veda, the teacher instructs the pupil. Speak the
truth, practise virtue."
This characteristic feature of the dcdrya coincides exactly with the definition
given by Manusmrti and Amarakosa.
'upan{ya tu ya/! iisyarrz vedam adhydpayed dvija/!
sakalparrz sarahasyarrz ca tam dcdryarrz pracaksate (Manusmrti 2.140).
"They call that Brahmin who initiates a pupil and teaches him the Veda
together with the Kalpa and Rahasya, the teacher (of the latter)."
mantra-vydkhyd-krd dcdrya ddes(d (Amarako~a 2.7.7).
"He who explains the mantra is dcdrya and guide."14
But the dcdrya's instruction is not limited to Vedic knowledge. He may impart to his student knowledge in general. The verb vid-(to know) and its substantive vidyd appear often in connection with the dcdrya.
dcdrytidd haiva vidyd vidild sddhi:jfharrz prdpayattli (Chandogya
Upani~ad 4.9.3).
"That the knowledge which has been learned from teacher best helps
one to attain his end."
athddhividyam: dcdrya/! purva-rupam, antevdsy uttara-rupam,
vjdyd sarrzdhi/:l pravacanarrz samdhdnam ily adhividyam (Taittirlya
Upanisad 1.3.3).
"Now as to knowledge: the teacher is the prior form, the pupil is the latter form, knowledge is their junction, instruction is the connection.
Thus, with regard to knowledge."15
From these passages, one may say that in Brahmal)ical texts the dcdrya
functions as a teacher especially of vedic knowledge and in the Upani~ads as
a teacher especially of philosophical and metaphysical knowledge, but
sometimes of knowledge in general. In both sorts of text, he is a teacher at
whose house a young Brahmin should live (dcdrya-ku!a)16 during his firs
DAVID PINGREE
THE KHETAMUKTAvALi OF NRSIMHA
One of the most distinguished families of jyauti~is in India was that whose
first member was Kesava, the son of Kamalakara of the Kausikagotra. 1 He
and his descendants resided at N andigrama (modern N andod in Gujarat,
north of Rajpipla and on the south bank of the Narmada near its mouth)
from the late fifteenth till the mid seventeenth centuries. Kesava, who
studied under Vaidyanatha, wrote an astronomical karal)a entitled
Grahakautuka or Khetakautuka, whose epoch is Saka 1418 = A.D. 1496.
The Khetasdraf.ll mentioned in Khetamuktdval{ 3 was presumably a set of
tables intended to accompany the Grahakautuka, though more than the
text's fifty years had passed in Saka 1488 = A.D. 1566, which is Nrsirpha's
epoch. The number was not meant to be precise.
Kesava had three sons: Gal)esa,2 Ananta,3 and Rama. The first wrote,
among many other works, a Grahaldghava, which became the standard
textbook of the school of astronomers known as the Gal)esapak~a.4 He
claims to have utilized his father's work; and the parameters used by
Nrsirpha are related to his.5
Nrsirpha,6 the son of Rama and the pupil of Gal)esa, was born, according
to Grahakaumud{7 IV 12, in Saka 1470 = A.D. 1548. He is the author of
several astronomical works, including a commentary on his uncle's
Grahaldghava, the Har~akaumud{; the Grahakaumudi~ which has as
epochs 31 March 1588 and 31 March 1603; and the Khetamuktdvali~
whose epoch is Sunday 31 March 1566 and which is edited here. Gal)esa's
great-grandson Gal)esa8 quotes Nrsirpha's Bhaga~lOpapatti in his commentary, Siromaf.liprakdsa, on Bhaskara's Siddhdntasiroma~li.9
There are three manuscripts of the Khetamuktdval{ MS. 1461 in the Indian Museum in CalcuttalO mentions no author. MS. 4502 in the Anup
Library in Bikaner, consisting of 38ff., is the only manuscript accompanied
by the set of tables computed by Nrsirpha; it was copied by Kr~l)asamati
Mala in Saka 1587 = A.D. 1665. I have not been able to consult either of
these, but have used MS. 54 in the Harvard College Library.
The manuscript consists of two parts, A and B, of 4ff. and 9ff. respectively; both were written by the same hand in the last century. The text occupies
ff. Iv-4r of A; it is followed, on ff. 4r-4v, by these two inept verses, of
whieh the second has as epoch Saka 1275 = A.D. 1353:
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144 DAVID PINGREE
sve\>tas ca avadhl kheta antaralakaladikam I
gatabhakte dinadyais ca grhe sankramal)o bhavet II
sake bal)adrisuryone tryasvaghne 'bdhyangasarpyute I
nagabal)ahrte labdharp varal; se~as tu na<;likal; II
Part B contains a tlka which breaks off, on f. 9v which is left mostly blank,
at the beginning of the commentary on verse 12. In the commentary on
verses 5- 7 and 9-11 are examples for Saka 1737 = A.D. 1815, which
must be the approximate date of the composition of this tlka. The commentary on verse 2 utilizes the word turaka (ef Hindi turra, Marathl tura) to explain avatarpsa: puno gal)akavaryakulavatarpsal; I gal)ake~u jyotirvitsu ye
varyal; pujyas te~arp kule 'vatarpsal; prakrtabha\>aya turakal; II The only
other indication of the provenance of the tika is in the commentary on verse
8, where in the example given the locality is 32 yojanas or 2;24° west
of the prime meridian: rekhasvadesamadhyasthayojanani 32 I e~am
abhrebhabhago ghatikadil; 0 I 24 I ayarp svadesasya pascimasthitatvad
abdapana<;ll$u 51481 5 rahital; 5 I 47 i 41 I ayarn spa$tabdapo jatal; II The
longitudinal difference between Ujjayinl and Nandigrama is 2;10°.
In the commentary on verse 6 the tlkakara computes the following true
sidereal longitudes of the planets for 7 April 1815 from the tables of the
Khetamuktd)lali~ which are here compared with modern computations of
their true tropical longitudes.
K hetamuktiival{ Modern
Saturn 4,48;13,0° 5,10°
Jupiter 2,44;29,0° 3,30
Mars 4,48;33,16° 5,5°
(Sun 0°) 17°
Venus 27;45,20° 43°
Mercury 5,35;16,0° 5,51°
---~----
srlgal)esaya namal; II
k~itibhrtsutaya tu kamado 'sau
budhavidyadhararamyapadapadmal; I
krpayardramana gurur gal)e
MASA TOSHI NAGA TOM I
MANASA-PRATYAKSA: A CONUNDRUM IN THE BUDDHIST
PRAMAijA SYSTEM
Almost fifty years have passed since the first milestone was laid down for a
critical study of the Buddhist pramalJa system by Theodor Stcherbatsky
with his publication of Buddhist Logic (2 vols., Bibliotheca Buddhica,
XXVI, Leningrad, 1930-32). The intervening years have witnessed many
significant publications providing fresh information on the works of
Dignaga and Dharmaklrti, the founding fathers of the Buddhist pramalJa
system. These publications place us on much sounder ground than ever
before for making an intellectual excursion into the inner sanctum of th.e
system. It is also true, however, that new findings in scholarship sometimes
lead to hitherto unnoticed problems and occasionally revive some of the old
ones, with their complexities now articulated in a new fashion. One such
case in the Buddhist pramalJa system is Y(lanasa-pratyaksa (mental
perception) as a variety of pratyaksa (perception). The question of why
Dignaga deemed it necessary to postulate manasa-pratyak!$a and just what
he meant by it still remains as much a conundrum to us as it was to postDharmaklrti philosophers in classical India and to Buddhist academics in
Tibet.' The aim of this article is merely to attempt to locate the proper place
for a tiny missing piece of a huge jigsaw puzzle - a piece that has been
shuffled and reshuffled over the centuries. It is written in a spirit of gratitude
to Daniel H.H. Ingalls, Wales Professor of Sanskrit at Harvard University,
who has patiently guided me on my venture into the maze of the Buddhist
pramalJa system.
I. INTRODUCTION
In discussing Dignaga's relation to Dharmaklrti, Ingalls observes, "Dignaga
found an interpreter in the seventh century, Dharmaklrti, who covered the
same ground in greater detail and on some points with greater precision, and
who furnished arguments against the more formidable opponents of a later
age.,,2 Indeed it took Dharmaklrti's classification and elucidation of
Dignaga's pratyaksa as consisiting of four varieties to bring manasapratyaksa, one of the varieties, to the attention of a large number of later
commentators. According to Dharmaklrti, the types of pratyaksa intended
243
M. Nagalomi, B.K. Malilal, J.M. Masson and E. Dimock (eds.),
Sanskrit and Indian Studies. 243-260.
Copyright © 1979 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
244 MASATOSHI NAGATOMI
by Digniiga are indriya-jiidna (=indriya-pratyaksa, sense-perception),
mano-vljnana (=mdnasa-pratyak$a, mental perception), sva-saf?1vedana
(self-awareness) of every cognition and yogi-jiidna (=yogi-pratyak$a,
yogin's perception).3 Of these, DharmakTrti defines mdnasa-pratyak$a as
being produced by sense-perception (indriya-jiidna) which is the
immediately preceding (homogenous) cause and which is contemporaneous
with the object immediately following its (real) object. DharmakTrti's good
intention to dispel whatever ambiguities he thought might exist with respect
to Digniiga's mdnasa-pratyak$a, however, had little effect in fully
convincing post-DharmakTrti academics, either Buddhist or non-Buddhist,
of the legitimacy of mdnasa-pratyak$a in Digniiga's pramdlJa system. The
less than enthusiastic reception Dharmottara and other post-DharmakTrti
followers accorded mdnasa-pratyak$a is evident in their basic attitude,
which was "Let us retain it because it was postulated by our multicdrya,
Digniiga. There is no harm in honoring its place in his pramdlJa system,
although it cannot be proved by a valid means of cognition."4
We shall begin our investigation of the topic by introducing the text in
which Digniiga's mdnasa-pratyaksa makes its official debut. The text is his
magnum opus, the PramdlJa-samuccaya (hereafter abbreviated as PS)
together with the PramdlJasamuccayavrtti (hereafter abbreviated as PSV),
his auto-commentary on PS. The translation of the text provided in the
following is from Professor Masaaki Hattori's Digndga on Perception, the
most comprehensive and authoritative work to date on PS, Book I.
mdnasaf?1 ctirtha-rdgtidisva-saf?1vittir akalpikd
mdnasam apy ruptidi-vi$aytilambanam
anubhavtikdra-pravrttaf?1 rdgtidi$u ca
sva-saf?1vedanam indriytinapek$atvdd
mdnasGI!l pratyak$am (PS, 1. K. 6ab and PSV)
There is also mental [perception, which is of two kinds: I awareness of
an I external I object and self-awareness of [such subordinate mental
activities as] passion and the like, [both of which are] free from
conceptual construction.
The mental [perception] which, taking a thing of color, etc., for its
object, occurs in the form of immediate experience (anubhava) is also
free from conceptual construction. The self-awareness (sva-saf?1vedana)